Is IPO Underperformance a Peso Problem? by Andrew Ang et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We thank Kodjo Apedjinou, Geert Bekaert, Alon Brav, Liz Demers, Michelle Lowry, Stephan Siegel, and
seminar participants at Columbia University and the Western Finance Association Annual Meetings for
helpful comments. Ang: Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway, 805 Uris, New York NY 10027; ph:
(212)  854-9154;  fax:  (212)  662-8474;  email:  aa610@columbia.edu;  WWW:  http://www.columbia.
edu/~aa610. Gu: Graduate School of Business 403A, Fordham University, 113 West 60th St, New York NY
10023; email: lgu@fordham.edu. Hochberg: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001
Sheridan  Road,  Chicago  IL  60208-2001,  ph:  (847)  467-4574;  fax:  (847)  491-5719;  email:
y-hochberg@kellogg.northwestern.edu; WWW: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/hochberg/htm.
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
©2006 by Andrew Ang, Li Gu and Yael V. Hochberg.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including ©
notice, is given to the source.Is IPO Underperformance a Peso Problem?
Andrew Ang, Li Gu and Yael V. Hochberg
NBER Working Paper No. 12203
April 2006
JEL No. G12, G14, G32
ABSTRACT
Recent studies suggest that the underperformance of IPOs in the post-1970 sample may be a small
sample effect or “Peso” problem. That is, IPO underperformance may result from observing too few
star performers ex-post than were expected ex-ante. We develop a model of IPO performance that
captures this intuition by allowing returns to be drawn from mixtures of outstanding, benchmark, or
poor  performing  states.  We  estimate  the  model  under  the  null  of  no  ex-ante  average  IPO
underperformance and construct small sample distributions of various statistics measuring IPO
relative performance. We find that small sample biases are extremely unlikely to account for the
magnitude of the post-1970 IPO underperformance observed in data.
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Since Ritter’s (1991) seminal study, many papers document that ﬁrms underperform relative to
benchmark indices, or to similar stocks, following their initial public offerings (IPOs).1 The
study of IPO long-run average underperformance is important, as IPO long-run underperfor-
mance may indicate a possible informational inefﬁciency in capital allocation, the inﬂuence
of behavioral fads in markets, or the existence of trading opportunities that produce superior
abnormal returns.
However, the acceptance of the existence of an IPO underperformance effect is far from
universal. In a recent paper, Schultz (2003) argues that more IPO activity follows successful
IPOs and that measuring the performance of IPOs in event time spuriously induces IPOs to
have low average returns, even if there are no average abnormal returns ex-ante. Schultz claims
that there is no underperformance of IPOs in calendar time. Gompers and Lerner (2003)
convincingly show that in an earlier sample from 1935 to 1972, IPOs do not underperform
aggregate benchmarks, in contrast to the post-1970 sample initially examined by Ritter (1991).
Gompers and Lerner suggest that the poor performance of offerings in the NASDAQ era
could simply arise by chance. The Gompers and Lerner (2003) study implies that the IPO
underperformance in the last three decades may be just a small sample effect. That is, there
may be no IPO underperformance ex-ante, but in the post-1970 period, we may have just drawn
a small sample where too many IPOs perform very poorly ex-post.
A small sample explanation to the IPO underperformance puzzle is initially suggested, but
not investigated, by Loughran and Ritter (1995). Loughran and Ritter propose that IPOs initially
have high valuations because investors are betting on long shots – that they have identiﬁed the
next Microsoft, TCBY, or eBay. If these investors are rational and there is no underperformance
ex-ante, an IPO underperformance in a small sample will result if the small sample does not
contain enough draws of these high-performing IPOs. That is, ex-post, the sample of IPOs is
small enough that there is a marked difference between the small sample distributions of the
statistics measuring IPO performance and their long-run asymptotic distributions, where in the
1 Recent summaries of the large IPO literature are provided by Ritter (1995) and Welch and Ritter (2002).
1population distribution, IPOs do not underperform.
As a simple example, suppose that the true population of IPOs has a small proportion (say
2%) of star performers that have extraordinarily high returns. The majority of IPOs (say
70%) exhibit, on average, zero abnormal returns, while a minority of IPOs (the remaining
28%) display, on average, low abnormal returns. In a small sample, we may over-sample
from the distributions representing zero, or low, abnormal returns. This implies that we may
easily under-sample star performing ﬁrms (say 1% in the sample, as opposed to 2% in the
population distribution). In the small sample, when we compute average long-run returns of
IPOs, we ﬁnd an IPO underperformance, but this underperformance arises because the small
sample distribution does not match the population distribution of IPOs. Hence, the average
underperformance of IPOs may be due to observing too few spectacularly successful IPOs in
the data than we expected ex-ante from the population distribution.
In this study, we make three main contributions to the IPO literature. First, we show that
the post-1970 sample of IPOs exhibits signiﬁcant underperformance in both event time and
calendar time. Schultz (2003) considers calendar-time returns on IPOs less than 60 months old
following the offering and ﬁnds that the average abnormal calendar-time return is close to zero.
Building on Schultz (2003), we also consider well-deﬁned trading strategies of an IPO portfolio
consisting of IPOs which have gone public within a particular formation period, but we consider
holding-periodreturnsofthisportfoliooverhorizonslongerthanonemonth. Inparticular, when
we consider holding-period returns longer than six months, we ﬁnd that IPO underperformance
reappears. Schultz (2003) misses this calendar-time IPO underperformance by only considering
a short holding-period horizon. Similarly, we ﬁnd that IPO underperformance is sensitive
to the portfolio-formation period. While Schultz (2003) ﬁnds no underperformance for a
portfolio-formation period of 12 months, IPO underperformance re-emerges when we expand
the portfolio-formation period to include IPOs which have gone public over the last two to
three years. Hence, we show that the Ritter (1991) ﬁnding of low IPO returns remains robust to
measurement in both event and calendar time.2
2 Dahlquist and de Jong (2003) and Viswanathan and Wei (2003) argue that Schultz’s (2003) ﬁndings are due
to an extreme assumption that the number of IPO events drops to zero after a negative abnormal return. This
2Second, we introduce a novel model of returns over time for IPO ﬁrms. We build a
Markov model that captures the intuition of the distribution of IPO returns being a mixture
of star performers, average performers, and ﬁrms that underperform. The distribution of star
performers has expected returns that are high, but this occurs with low probability. Average or
underperforming IPO returns are drawn with much higher probability, and these have average
zero and negative excess returns, respectively. At each point in time, an IPO’s return is drawn
from one of these three distributions, and, following Hamilton (1989), which distribution
prevails at each point in time is determined by a Markov variable that is unobserved to the
econometrician. The Markov states are persistent, so that a ﬁrm that has experienced Microsoft-
type draws in the past is more likely to draw Microsoft-type returns in the future.
Our ﬂexible Markov-mixture data generating process (DGP) can capture small sample
bias, or Peso problem effects. As Evans (1996) demonstrates, Markov models are ideal for
capturing differences between population distributions and sample realizations, because the
estimation method permits the implied probabilities of drawing regimes (the Markov process)
to be inferred endogenously. This allows the parameters of each distribution (outperforming,
average, or underperforming) to be estimated under the null of zero average abnormal returns.
Markov models have been previously used to investigate Peso problems in time-series data. For
example, Bekaert, Hodrick and Marshall (2001) examine a Peso problem explanation for the
Expectations Hypothesis in interest rates, Evans and Lewis (1995) examine small sample issues
in Unbiasedness Hypothesis tests with exchange rate data, and Rietz (1988) and Cecchetti, Lam
and Mark (1993) argue that the equity premium in stock market data is high because of rare
adverse events. In contrast to these studies, we analyze a small sample explanation in the cross-
section of IPO returns using event-time returns.
Third, we ﬁnd that small sample bias is very unlikely to account for the magnitude of
non-stationarity causes Schultz’s abnormal return estimator to be not well-deﬁned in large samples. However,
Viswanathan and Wei (2004) show that in the Schultz (2003) setting, event-time returns are consistent estimators
of the null hypothesis of market efﬁciency and that event returns asymptotically converge to zero under standard
assumptions. In contrast, to these studies, we show IPO underperformance in calendar time is sensitive to the
portfolio-formation strategy and re-appears when longer formation periods or holding periods are considered.
3IPO underperformance observed in the post-1970 sample. We estimate the Markov-switching
model using Gibbs Sampling, which is a fast and tractable Bayesian estimation technique.
Gibbs sampling is an estimation method that is particularly suitable for problems where
likelihood functions are difﬁcult to derive or maximize, or where only conditional, rather
than full likelihood distributions are available.3 We use the model estimates to generate small
sample distributions of IPO long-horizon abnormal returns under the null that there is no ex-
ante IPO underperformance. We compare the small sample distributions with the estimated
point statistics of IPO long-horizon returns from actual data. We ﬁnd that the small sample
distributions implied by the model do not remotely come close to encompassing the long-
horizon point statistics in the data. Hence, we fail to ﬁnd a small sample explanation for the IPO
underperformance effect post-1970, suggesting that the IPO underperformance phenomenon is
not “simply an historical accident” (Gompers and Lerner (2003), p. 1931).
Our approach is related to the statistical inference problems in long-horizon returns raised
by Conrad and Kaul (1993), Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), and Brav
(2000). These authors show that statistics measuring long-run performance relative to a
benchmark, such as buy-and-hold and cumulative abnormal returns, are subject to severe small
sample biases. However, they do not explicitly consider DGPs that impose the null of no
underperformance in a model designed to capture Peso problems.
In our analysis, we concentrate on using broad market-based benchmarks because it is
uncertainwhichriskadjustmentisappropriateattheﬁrmlevel. Forexample, BravandGompers
(1997) and Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) argue that if risk-adjustments are made to equity
returns on the basis of size and book-to-market ratios, then the IPO underperformance effect
fails to appear.4 Eckbo and Norli (2005) argue for additional controls for leverage and liquidity.
On the other hand, Loughran and Ritter (2000) show that correcting for abnormal performance
using Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market factors is inappropriate because the
Fama-French factors are contaminated by the effects of new ﬁrm issues. Because of these
3 See Kim and Nelson (1999) for an overview of Markov-switching models and the Gibbs sampling procedure.
4 Similar appropriate benchmarking arguments are made by Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) for the
underperformance of seasoned public offerings.
4issues, Ritter and Welch (2002) stress that the IPO long-run underperformance puzzle is not
one of selecting appropriate ﬁrm risk adjustments, but rather that IPO ﬁrms, or ﬁrms with
characteristics similar to IPOs, perform poorly compared to market-based benchmarks. Schultz
(2003) also employs aggregate benchmarks, and Gompers and Lerner (2003) document that
there is no IPO long-run underperformance relative to broad-based indices in the pre-NASDAQ
sample.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data used in the
paper, and presents summary statistics of IPO ﬁrm long-run returns for event-time and calendar-
time portfolios. Section III describes the Markov model underlying our small sample analysis
discusses the estimation results. In Section IV, we apply the model to investigate if the IPO
underperformance post-1970 can be explained by small sample bias. Section V concludes.
II. Data
Our data consists of two IPO samples. The ﬁrst sample, which we refer to as the full sample,
consists of ﬁrms going public from 1970 to 1996. These ﬁrms are drawn from the Securities
Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issues database. To be included in the sample, an IPO ﬁrm
must have an offer price greater than one dollar and must be subsequently listed on the Center
for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ tapes within six months of
the offering date. In line with common practice, we exclude from our sample all unit offerings,
REITs, ADRs, limited partnerships and public offerings of closed-end funds. The full sample
consists of 4,843 initial public offerings taking place during the period 1970 to 1996. The
second sample, obtained from Jay Ritter’s IPO database at iporesources.org, comprises 1,524
ﬁrms conducting initial public offerings in the 1975-1984 period.5 We concentrate primarily
on reporting our results for the full sample, and comment on how our methodology fares on
Ritter’ssample. Todescribeourdata, weﬁrstconﬁrmtheexistenceofanIPOunderperformance
phenomenon in event time in Section A, following the original ﬁndings of Ritter (1991), and in
5 Ritter’s (1991) original sample size is 1,526. Of these, we failed to match two ﬁrms (Area Communication
and Advanced Semiconductor) to returns in CRSP.
5calendar time in Section B, contrary to the ﬁndings of Schultz (2003).
A. Event-Time IPO Returns
Following standard practice, we construct benchmark-adjusted returns for stock i relative to
benchmark m in month t as:
(1) rit(m) = Rit ¡ Rmt;
where Rit is the raw return of ﬁrm i in event month t and Rmt is the benchmark return in event
month t. We compute IPO benchmark-adjusted returns as the raw returns on an IPO minus
the benchmark return for the corresponding period. We use three benchmarks: (1) the CRSP
value-weighted NYSE and AMEX index, (2) the CRSP value-weighted NASDAQ index, and
(3) the CRSP smallest decile of NYSE ﬁrms. These benchmarks are used in many IPO studies
as they represent a set of aggregate indices that are easily investable and represent benchmark
alternatives to an IPO investment. We compute returns in equation (1) from the ﬁrst listing on
the CRSP daily return tapes. Event months are deﬁned as successive 21 trading-day periods.
Thus, returns for the ﬁrst month comprise the returns on listed days 2-22, the second month of
returns comprises the returns of listed days 23-43, and so on.
Following Ritter (1991), we deﬁne a cumulative average benchmark m-adjusted excess












and nt is the number of stocks in the IPO portfolio in event month t. Thus, ARt(m) is the
average benchmark-adjusted return, where the averaging is done across all IPO ﬁrms in event
month t. Hence, the CARs(m) statistic cumulates the average abnormal IPO returns across
various horizons s. When a ﬁrm is delisted during event month t, the return of that IPO is
computeduntilthedayofdelisting. WeusethenotationCAR(NYSE/AMEX),CAR(NASDAQ)
6and CAR(SMALL) to indicate cumulative abnormal returns calculated using excess returns
relative to the NYSE and AMEX index, the NASDAQ index, and the CRSP smallest size decile,
respectively.
We also compute cumulative excess holding-period returns (CHP) of stock i relative to




(1 + rit(m)) ¡ 1;
where rit(m) is the excess return of stock i relative to benchmark m deﬁned in equation (1). The
one-period excess return, rit(m), is the return to a zero-cost strategy that goes long an IPO and
shorts the benchmark m portfolio. Cumulating these returns provides the long-horizon return







Since the CHPs are holding-period returns, to easily compare CHPs across different horizons
we compute annualized CHP statistics using the transformation:
(5) CHPs(m)




and CHP(SMALL) to denote CHPs computed relative to the various benchmarks. We use both
the CAR and CHP statistics to measure IPO performance.
Table 1 reports various summary statistics of event-time IPO returns. We turn ﬁrst to the
number and proportion of surviving IPOs, presented at the top of the table. There is remarkable
attrition in the number of IPO ﬁrms surviving after the date of their initial public offering. While
the majority (over 98%) of IPOs survive their ﬁrst year, 39% of IPOs delist within ﬁve years.
This implies that the delisting process is an important part of modeling the distribution of IPO
returns, which we explicitly take into account in our empirical framework.6
6 Note that not all delistings of IPO ﬁrms are necessarily due to bankruptcy or liquidation. A signiﬁcant
proportion of ﬁrms delist due to merger or acquisition activity. The event-time CAR and CHP statistics do not
7Second, the CARs clearly show the IPO underperformance effect. As can be seen from the
mean CARs reported in Panel A of the table, IPOs underperform as early as after one year post-
issue in event time. For example, at a 12-month horizon, the average CAR is -6% (-5%) relative
to small stocks (NASDAQ). After 60 months, the value of the CAR statistic is a dramatic -16%
relative to small stocks, -23% relative to NYSE/AMEX, and -31% relative to NASDAQ. Using
Ritter (1991) t-statistics, all the CAR t-statistics corresponding to these very large negative
CAR point estimates are highly signiﬁcant. However, these t-statistics must be interpreted with
care, because Barber and Lyon (1997) show that the small sample distributions for the CAR
statistics are severely skewed compared to the Ritter (1991) asymptotic distributions. In our
empirical work, we directly construct a small sample distribution under the null of zero IPO
underperformance and directly measure the signiﬁcance of the CAR point estimates.
In Panel B of Table 1, the CHPs display similar patterns to the CARs, showing that the
IPO underperformance starts as early as one year in event time. For example, the average CHP
relative to NYSE/AMEX is -4.6% per annum at a one year horizon, and -4.4% per annum at a
three-year horizon. TheaverageCHP relativeto NYSE/AMEX decreasesto -2.9% perannum at
the ﬁve-year horizon. In summary, these results conﬁrm Ritter’s (1991) results that there exists
a strong IPO underperformance effect for IPO performance in event time relative to aggregate
benchmarks.
B. Calendar-Time IPO Returns
While Table 1 conﬁrms IPO underperformance in event time, Schultz (2003) argues that
there is no evidence of IPO underperformance in calendar time. Schultz proposes that higher
stock prices result in more equity issuance, and that this pseudo-market timing is behind the
underperformance in event-time, equal-weighted abnormal returns. Calendar-time abnormal
returns based on weighting each calendar period equally are not affected by psuedo-market
need to be adjusted for delisting returns because these statistics take data only up to the delisting date. In contrast,
calendar-time returns must be adjusted for a delisting return because they represent investable portfolio returns, as
we discuss below.
8timing and Schultz argues that there is no IPO underperformance in calendar time. We show
here that IPO underperformance is also seen in calendar time, contrary to Schultz’s claims.
Schultz (2003) concentrates only on one-month holding-period returns. To examine
calendar-time returns of IPO returns, we generalize the holding period to look at horizons longer
than one month, up to a 60-month holding period. In month t, we form an IPO portfolio by
placing an equal amount of money in all IPOs which have gone public over the last F months
(the portfolio-formation period). This portfolio is held from time t to t + k. At time t + k, the
portfolioisrebalancedtoonlyholdIPOswhichhavegonepublicoverthelast F months. Hence,
our calendar-time IPO portfolio returns represent the returns on an equally-weighted portfolio
of IPOs, each IPO no older than F months. We examine holding-period returns over k = 1 to
k = 60 months. After computing the calendar-time IPO raw returns, we subtract the benchmark
returns from the IPO portfolio returns to compute benchmark-adjusted holding-period returns
in calendar time.
Because of the large number of IPO delistings (see Table 1), it is important to adjust for
the delisting return. Shumway (1997) recommends assigning a delisting return of -0.3 to an
arbitrary ﬁrm delisting from CRSP and Shumway and Warther (1999) recommend using a
corrected return of -0.55 for a delisting from the NASDAQ stock exchange. In computing
their delisting returns, Shumway and Warther track the returns of ﬁrms after they delist using
data from the Pink Sheets (published by the National Quotations Bureau) up to 100 days post-
delisting. In the post-1970 sample, almost all (93%) delisting IPOs delist from NASDAQ,
so we assign a delisting return of -0.55 to all delisting IPOs. This correction is likely to be
conservative for two reasons. First, IPOs tend to have low event-time returns relative to the
average seasoned, listed ﬁrm. Second, the ﬁnal return from a ﬁrm that liquidates might not
be received for many months after the delisting. Delisting returns are important for investable
calendar-time returns because the money returned from investing in the delisting ﬁrm is re-
invested in the IPO portfolio going forward.
Table 2 reports calendar-time IPO returns over various holding-period horizons. The
average returns are annualized to make comparison easier. To use all the data, we report
9the means using overlapping observations, but the point estimates are very similar using non-
overlapping observations. To account for the moving average errors induced by the overlapping
observations, we compute t-statistics with Newey-West (1987) standard errors, using a lag
length of one less than the holding-period horizon. Note that the case of k = 1 involves no
overlapping observations. If we compute the standard errors with simple OLS t-statistics, the
magnitude of the OLS t-statistics are approximately four to six times larger than the robust
t-statistics reported in the table.
When we consider a portfolio of ﬁrms that have gone public over the last year (F = 12),
Panel A of Table 2 shows that there is no statistically signiﬁcant underperformance for one-
month holding-period returns, no matter which benchmark is used. In fact, for a one-month
horizon, IPOs which have less than a one-year listing anniversary outperform the NYSE/AMEX
index by 1.4% per annum. This is the result reported by Schultz (2003).7
However, as we increase the holding period from one month to 60 months, the IPO
underperformance puzzle re-emerges. Beginning with a holding-period horizon of six months,
the point estimates in Table 2 are negative relative to all three benchmarks. At a one-year
horizon, there is an average performance of -7.2%, and -7.5% per annum relative to the
NASDAQ, and small stock indices, respectively. This underperformance is signiﬁcant at the
5% level. The average performance of IPOs relative to the total NYSE/AMEX benchmark is
-3.5% per annum at the one-year horizon, but is not statistically signiﬁcant. Although the IPO
performance relative to the NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ indices are statistically insigniﬁcant at
the 5% level at the 60-month horizon, the magnitude of underperformance is 2.3% per annum
for the NYSE/AMEX benchmark and around 7% per annum for the NASDAQ benchmark.
For a 60-month holding period horizon, the IPO portfolio underperforms small stocks by an
economically very large 12.4% per annum, but this is only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%
level.
7 Schultz (2003) takes a universe of IPO returns up to 60 months following the offering, and then considers
calendar-time returns of these ﬁrms. This corresponds to a one-month holding-period horizon but Schultz’s
formation period interval changes over time, and is weighted towards selecting IPOs with short and intermediate
histories post-offering.
10For the three-year formation period reported in Panel B, the evidence of calendar-time
underperformance is even stronger. At the six-month horizon, the performance point estimates
are already large and negative, and statistically signiﬁcant relative to the NASDAQ (-6.9% per
annum) and small stock (-7.3% per annum) indices at the 1% level. The performance at a 12-
month horizon is -3.5%, -7.2%, and -7.4% per annum relative to NYSE/AMEX, NASDAQ, and
small stocks, respectively. While underperformance relative to the broad NYSE/AMEX index
is not statistically signiﬁcant, the underperformance is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level
for the NASDAQ benchmark and signiﬁcant at the 1% level for the small stock benchmark.
The negative performance estimates increase in magnitude at the 60-month holding-period
horizon, where the IPO performance point estimates are -7.1%, -13.0%, and -20.6% per annum
relative to NYSE/AMEX, NASDAQ, and small stocks, respectively. The underperformance in
calendar-time relative to small stocks is particularly large, and highly statistically signiﬁcant
for all holding-period horizons greater than six months. Holding a portfolio of IPOs which go
public over the last three years produces stronger evidence of long-term underperformance than
using a formation period of just one year, because the longer formation period selects more
seasoned IPO ﬁrms. Note that underperformance is greater for more seasoned ﬁrms in event
time: IPOs actually tend to outperform benchmarks in the ﬁrst six months of event time, but
tend to underperform signiﬁcantly over three to ﬁve years post-issue in event time.8
Why does the IPO underperformance show up in calendar time only for long holding-period
horizons? First, by focusing only on one-month holding periods, Schultz’s method does not
capture the long-term performance of IPOs. Table 2 focuses on the effects of changing the
formation period of the IPO portfolio, and the holding-period horizon. As Schultz holds the
8 We comment, but do not report, on the results if we make the extreme assumption that a delisting IPO returns
all of its money back to an investor immediately (so there is a delisting return of 0.0%). In this case, with a three-
year portfolio-formation period, the IPO portfolio performance is -0.2%, -4.4%, and -9.2% per annum, relative
to NYSE/AMEX, NASDAQ, and small stocks, respectively. These averages are statistically insigniﬁcant at the
5% level. However, this scenario is extremely unrealistic because many IPOs which delist go bankrupt, and the
remainder of any invested money is only realized with a long lag. In fact, we view the Shumway and Warther
(1999) delisting correction of -0.55 as conservative, given the very low event-time IPO returns reported in Table 1.
11IPO portfolio only for one month, the average return is heavily weighted towards short-run and
intermediate-term event-month returns. Once we consider different holding-period horizons
and different formation periods, the IPO underperformance re-emerges. Longer holding-period
horizons, or longer portfolio-formation periods, allow the portfolio to contain more seasoned
IPOs, which have relatively low average returns. Finally, Schultz also ignores the returns of
delisting IPO ﬁrms. As shown in Table 1, there is a remarkable proportion of IPO ﬁrms that
delist from CRSP within ﬁve years of issue.
Having now made the case for long-run IPO underperformance in both event time
and calendar time in the post-1970 sample, we now examine the hypothesis that the IPO
underperformance may be due to small sample, or Peso problem, effects.
III. The Model
A. Capturing a Small Sample Problem
The essence of a small sample explanation for long-run IPO underperformance is that the data
we observe may not contain the same number of high-ﬂying IPOs which we expect from the
population distribution. We illustrate this intuition in Figure 1. Suppose that IPO returns are
drawn from one of three states: (i) an extraordinary state, earning 70% over benchmark, (ii) an
average state, where the IPO earns the benchmark return, and (iii) an underperforming state,
where the IPO underperforms the benchmark by 5%. In population, the extraordinary state
occurs 2% of the time, the average state occurs 70% of the time, and the bad state occurs 28%
of the time. The extraordinary state has a very high mean, but occurs rarely, so it represents
a draw of a highly successful IPO. The average abnormal return for the population is then
0:02 £ 0:7 + 0:7 £ 0 + 0:28 £ (¡0:05) = 0%.
In a small sample, we may not observe the same frequency of extraordinary, average, or
underperforming states as the population frequency. Suppose that in a small sample, we observe
that extraordinary returns constitute only 1% of the returns, instead of the 2% frequency of
extraordinary states in the population. If the proportion of the benchmark returns remains the
12same as the population, at 70%, then we over-sample low return states. In this case, the average
abnormal return for the sample is then negative, at 0:01 £ 0:7 + 0:7 £ 0 + 0:29 £ (¡0:05) =
¡0:75%. Hence, we observe an average underperformance in the sample, but this is because the
population distributionand the smallsample population are dissimilar. If wewere to observethe
same frequency of extraordinary returns in the sample as the proportion of extraordinary returns
in the population, then there would be no average underperformance in the small sample.
For this type of Peso problem intuition to be reasonable, we would hope that the distribution
of IPO returns in data already contains some large observations – the Peso explanation requires
that we have not observed enough similar large observations in a small sample. Panel A of Table
3 shows that the right-hand tail of the distribution of monthly IPO returns encompasses some
spectacular one-month returns. The magnitude of the top ten monthly returns is large enough
that ﬁrms can easily increase their value by 3-6 times within one month, and the highest one-
month IPO return is over 2500% (which corresponds to Club-Theatre Network in its 21st event
month). For comparison, the average monthly return for an IPO in our sample is 0.83% per
month. Panel B shows that the top ten IPOs in the ﬁve years after their issue date approximately
double in price every year.9 Clearly, Table 3 shows that the observed distribution of IPO returns
includes some impressive returns. According to a small sample explanation, the population
distribution of IPO returns must contain a higher frequency of these types of returns, or even
more spectacular returns.
It would be tempting to construct a population distribution of IPOs by just sampling
repeatedly from the extreme IPO returns in Table 3. However, we cannot be sure that these
returns represent the true distribution of star performers, particularly under the null hypothesis
of no ex-ante IPO underperformance. The IPO data have an overall average underperformance
and the data may more correctly represent the appropriate distribution under the alternative
hypothesis that there exists long-run IPO underperformance. The true distribution of the
outstanding performers under the null of no ex-ante IPO underperformance is directly not
9 Interestingly, Microsoft is not among these ﬁrms. For comparison, the cumulative ﬁve-year annualized post-
IPO return of Microsoft is 72%.
13observable. However, we now describe how the distribution of IPO returns under the null of
no ex-ante underperformance can be inferred from a rigorous model that captures the simple
intuition of the picture in Figure 1.
B. A Markov-Switching Model
Extending the simple intuition of Figure 1 into an econometric model requires several steps.
First, instead of discrete possible outcomes (for example, outperforming, benchmark, and
underperforming) for an IPO’s return in excess of benchmark, rit, we specify a series of
distributions that depend on a state sit prevailing at time t. If the prevailing state corresponds to
an outperformance state, then the IPO’s return is drawn from the corresponding outperformance
distribution. We specify these state-dependent distributions to be normal. Second, we specify
the states sit to be persistent, so if a ﬁrm has been an outperformer in the past, it is more likely
to be an outperformer next period. Finally, we observe the draws of actual IPO returns, but the
econometrician does not observe the sequence of states so the estimation method must infer the
states from the data.
Formally, this is a Markov-switching model of the type introduced by Hamilton (1989),
where the states sit follow a Markov chain, and the IPO draws are from time-varying mixtures
of normals.10 As Bekaert et al. (1998) and Timmermann (2000), among others, comment,
mixtures of normal distributions are easily able to capture heteroskedasticity, fat tails, and other
features of equity returns. At each point in time, conditional on no delisting, the abnormal IPO
return rit follows the process:
(6) rit = ¹(sit) + ¾(sit)"it;
where "it is IID N(0;1) and the state sit follows a Markov chain that can take values sit =
1;:::;K states. For simplicity, we specify that the draws of "it and sit are uncorrelated across
ﬁrms in event time.
10 Markov-switching models have been used to model equity returns by, among others, Turner, Startz and Nelson
(1989), Hamilton and Susmel (1994), Hamilton and Lin (1996), Ramchand and Susmel (1998), Perez-Quiros and
Timmermann (2001), and Ang and Bekaert (2002).
14In equation (6), the IPO return is normally distributed conditional on the state sit. However,
as the prevailing state sit changes across time, the IPO returns are drawn from different
distributions. This causes the unconditional IPO return to be non-normal and heteroskedastic.
We can regard each IPO as a new draw from the DGP in equation (6). The states sit are drawn
from a common Markov chain, which causes the individual IPO returns to be correlated.
We estimate models with K = 2 and K = 3 states. In the case of two regimes, the Markov
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where P11 = Pr(sit = 1jsi;t¡1 = 1) and P22 = Pr(sit = 2jsi;t¡1 = 2) are constants and are
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;
which satisﬁes the relation ¼ = ¦¼, where ¼ = (¼1 ¼2)0.11
If K = 2, we can think of the two distributions corresponding to sit = 1;2 as corresponding
to an outperformance distribution and an underperformance distribution. While each IPO may
be in a different state, we restrict the transition probabilities of the IPO states to be the same
across IPOs. The transition probabilities are persistent, and capture the notion that a ﬁrm that
has outstanding returns in the past is more likely to be an outperforming ﬁrm in the future.
We estimate the model under the null of zero expected abnormal outperformance, so we
place restrictions on the model parameters such that E(rit) = 0. This involves the restriction:
(8) E[rit] = ¼1¹1 + ¼2¹2 = 0:
11 Estimating the model under time-varying transition probabilities is not computationally feasible and cannot be
done with conjugate draws (see the Appendix). However, because the rejection of the null of no underperformance
is so strong, and the fact that the IPO draws in event time are correlated, through the stable distribution of the states
sit, we believe that generalizing the model to include time-varying probabilities would not signiﬁcantly change
our results or conclusions.
15Hence, there is a restriction involving the conditional means of the distributions of each state:




which we impose in the estimation. Note that this restriction only involves the means of the
state-dependent distributions, but not the volatility parameters.
For K = 3 states, we can interpret the states as representing periods of outperformance,
benchmark performance, or underperformance. In this case, we specify the transition
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where P11 = Pr(sit = 1jsi;t¡1 = 1), P21 = Pr(sit = 1jsi;t¡1 = 2), P22 = Pr(sit =
2jsi;t¡1 = 2), and P33 = Pr(sit = 3jsi;t¡1 = 3). With the speciﬁcation in equation (10), ﬁrms
transit through the benchmark performance state on their way from the outperforming state to
the underperforming state, and vice versa. This means that we do not allow a ﬁrm to jump
immediately from outstanding performance today to underperformance next period. However,
we also consider the case of an unrestricted three-state ¦ matrix where a direct transition from
outperformance to underperformance can occur.
To impose the null of zero expected abnormal performance in the case of K = 3 states, we
impose the restriction:
(11) E[rit] = ¼1¹1 + ¼2¹2 + ¼3¹3 = 0;
where ¼j = Pr(sit = j) are the stable probabilities of the system. Rearranging, we can write





Furthermore, we identify the abnormal return in state sit = 2 as the average performing state
with an expected abnormal return of zero, so we set ¹2 = 0. This yields the restriction:




16How does this model capture the Peso problem intuition? We impose the null of expected
benchmark performance through equations (9) or (13). However, we allow a state where an IPO
may potentially spectacularly outperform the benchmark return. The estimation reconciles the
apparent IPO underperformance in data by estimating the parameters of the outperformance
distribution such that the null is satisﬁed. We do not directly observe the outperformance
distribution in data, but the model is able to capture the Peso effect through the transition
probabilities and the state-dependent mean parameters.
To complete the model, we specify the attrition process of IPOs. This is important, because
as Table 1 shows, 40% of IPOs delist within ﬁve years after their issue date.12 We ﬁrst model
the delisting process, and then, conditional on no delisting, apply the Markov-switching model
of IPO returns in equation (6). We draw the delisting time Ti of the ith IPO from a Geometric
distribution with probability p, where:
(14) Pr(Ti = k) = (1 ¡ p)
k¡1p;
where Ti is in months. If Ti < 60, then the IPO delists within ﬁve event years post-issue,
whereas if Ti ¸ 60, we observe a full ﬁve-year event history of that IPO’s returns. Hence,
equation (14) represents a truncated Geometric distribution. We assume that the probability p
is the same across all ﬁrms, and the delisting time of each IPO is IID. Conditional on Ti, the
IPO’s returns are drawn from the Markov-switching process in equation (6) for Ti observations.
A more common speciﬁcation for a point process such as Ti is a Poisson distribution, but we
show that a Poisson distribution cannot ﬁt the persistent decay pattern of the IPO attrition rates
observed in data.
The model estimation is non-trivial because of the large cross-section of ﬁrms (4,843 IPOs
over the full sample). Recent advances in Bayesian methods allow us to estimate the model
using Gibbs sampling techniques, following Albert and Chib (1993). We provide details of
12 An alternative way to model IPO delisting is to include a fourth, absorbing state into the transition probability
matrix. However, the algorithms used to estimate regime-switching models require that the transition matrix be
ergodic to ﬁlter the states that are unobserved to the econometrician, particularly if the initial state is set to be the
stable probabilities of the Markov process. See, for example, Hamilton (1989).
17the estimation method in the Appendix. The Gibbs sampler has several advantages. First,
because we model the delisting process and the return of an IPO is speciﬁed conditional on no-
delisting, direct construction of the likelihood function is highly complex. The Gibbs sampler
operates on a series of conditional distributions, which are well-speciﬁed in our model. For
example, the distribution of the delisting time, Ti, is a Geometric distribution (equation (14))
and the distribution of the IPO return conditional on Ti and each state sit is a normal distribution
(equation (6)).
Second, instead of performing a complex optimization, we construct the posterior distribu-
tion of the parameters by simulating from each conditional distribution in turn. This is much
easier than maximizing a highly non-linear likelihood function. Finally, the Gibbs sampler
accounts for parameter uncertainty, which we take into account by analyzing the small sample
performance of the CAR and CHP statistics. We estimate the models using monthly IPO returns
adjusted by the CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX index of post-event time and use a 60-
month event horizon. We also estimate (but do not report) the models for Ritter’s (1991) original
data sample, where the event horizon is 36 months.
Naturally, our statistical inference depends on the ability of our DGP to match data and to
successfully capture a Peso problem. We believe that our model is more than ﬂexible enough
for this purpose, because the superstar state can potentially have a very large expected return,
the superstar state is potentially persistent or very ﬂeeting, and there are no restrictions on the
fraction of returns belonging to each state.
C. Estimation Results
We ﬁrst comment on the results of the delisting process and then describe the estimated
parameters of the Markov-switching process. The point estimate of the geometric probability
p in equation (14) is 0.008. This parameter is very precisely estimated, with a standard error
of 0.001, because of the large number of IPOs in the sample. Table 4 reports the actual, and
average numbers of surviving ﬁrms for various event months for our geometric distribution in
equation (14), and a Poisson distribution for comparison. The ﬁt of the Geometric distribution
18is very good, but slightly under-estimates the actual number of surviving ﬁrms after one year
(4433 versus 4767 in the data), while matching almost exactly the actual number of surviving
ﬁrms after ﬁve years (3015 versus 2966 in the data). In contrast, a Poisson distribution ﬁtted
to data has an extremely poor ﬁt, predicting that all ﬁrms should delist within ﬁve event years,
because it cannot match the observed slow attrition rate of IPOs in data.
We report the parameter estimates of the Markov-switching part of the DGP in Table 5.
We report the mean of the posterior distribution of each parameter, together with the standard
deviation of the posterior distribution in parentheses. Panel A reports results for the two-state
model. We can interpret state 1 as the overperformance state, which has a mean of 4.2% per
month and a large monthly volatility of 40%, and state 2 represents an underperformance state,
which has a mean of -0.8% per month, with a monthly volatility of 12%. The estimates of
the transition matrix ¦ in equation (7) show that the underperformance state is very persistent,
with a half-life of 22 months.13 In contrast, a ﬁrm has a 25% probability of moving from the
outperformance state to the underperformance state each month. The transition probabilities in
¦ correspond to stable probabilities of 16% (84%) for state 1 (2).14
Panel B reports the results of the three-state model. We report two estimates, one with a
transition probability matrix ¦ following equation (7), where the IPO cannot directly transition
from being an outperformer to an underperformer, and the other estimate with an unconstrained
¦ matrix. In the constrained ¦ estimation, the distribution of IPO returns in the outperformance
13 Because the Markov states are persistent, the model endogenously generates persistence of IPO returns.
However, the large standard deviations of IPO returns make this autocorrelation small in the model and hard
to pin down in the data. In the three-state model with a constrained transition matrix, the implied IPO
autocorrelation is -0.0006, with a posterior standard deviation of 0.0004. The slight negative autocorrelation results
from star performers being more likely to transform into benchmark-performing or underperforming ﬁrms than
underperforming IPOs becoming star performers. In the data, the mean autocorrelation across IPOs is -0.0443
with a cross-sectional deviation of 0.1680. Thus, our model and IPO data can shed little light on stock-level
reversals or momentum.
14 The implied monthly standard deviation for IPO returns implied by the two-state model is 19.3% per month,
which we can compare to the IPO return volatility of 19.2% in data. The corresponding number for the three-state
model with the constrained ¦ matrix is 19.4%.
19state 1 has a mean of 22.7% per month, with a very high monthly volatility of 73.1%. This state
occurs, on average, 2.1% of the time. While this state has a very high average return, the
very top IPO returns in our sample reported in Table 3 comfortably exceed this average return,
which suggests that some of the high IPO returns in data could be drawn from this type of
outperforming state. The benchmark performance state 2 has zero expected excess returns, by
construction, and has a standard deviation of 10.2% per month. This is the predominant state
for IPOs, with a stable probability of 60.3%. The underperformance state 3 has a mean of -1.3%
per month and a slightly higher standard deviation of 22.3% per month.
This estimation reﬂects our intuition of a benchmark performance state and an underperfor-
mance state, from where the majority of IPOs are drawn, and an extraordinary state that occurs
rarely (2.1% on average). The transition matrix ¦ shows that each state is persistent, with
IPOs which are benchmark (underperformers) having a 94.3% (92.7%) chance to remain in that
same state the following month. The outperformance state is less persistent, with a probability
of P11 = 0:684 of remaining an outperformer next period, conditional on being an outperformer
this period.
The unconstrained ¦ estimation also broadly reﬂects this same intuition, except that the
stable probability of the benchmark performance state 2 decreases to 15.8% (compared to
60.3% in the constrained ¦ estimation), and the stable probability of the underperformance
state 3 increases to 82.4%. Once we allow ﬁrms to immediately switch from being winners
to underperformers, only 28.9% of outperformers remain outperformers the next month, while
57.6% and 13.6% of outperformers transition to benchmark performance and underperformance
states, respectively. Thus, with an unconstrained ¦ matrix, the winner state 1 becomes even
more extreme, having a stable probability of only 1.8%, and an expected return of 26.4% per
month.
An alternative interpretation of the estimation with three states and an unconstrained ¦
matrix is a system where the majority of IPOs underperform with an average return of -0.6%
per month. A smaller number of IPOs have higher returns, in line with the benchmark, while
a very small fraction (1.8%) have extremely high returns, on average. Once an IPO is drawn
20into the loser state 3, or transitions into this state, it is very likely to remain a loser, with a
probability of 99.7% per month. A benchmark ﬁrm is likely to continue to perform in line
with its benchmark status, with a probability of staying a benchmark ﬁrm of P22 = 0:930. In
contrast, the rare outperforming IPO is unlikely to continue its extraordinarily high returns, with
a probability of remaining an outperforming IPO of P11 = 0:289, and very quickly transitions
to becoming a benchmark performer or an underperformer. Nevertheless, the unconstrained
estimation results maintain the intuition of only a small minority of IPOs enjoying very high
average returns.
The Bayesian estimation also allows us to compute Bayes factors, which provide a method
of testing the null of the two-state Markov model against the three-state models.15 The Bayes








where H1 and H2 are the models being tested, Y is the data, and p(H1) is the prior on model
H1 and p(H2) is the prior on model H2. For example, in our setting, H1 would be a two-regime
MarkovmodelandH2 wouldbeathree-regimeMarkovmodel. Givennon-informativepriorson
both models, the posterior odds ratio simpliﬁes to the Bayes factor, B12 ´ p(Y jH1)=p(Y jH2).
WecomputetheBayesfactorusingthe harmonicmeanestimatorofKass andRaftery(1995)
and ﬁnd extremely strong evidence in favor of the three state models against the two state
model. The value of 2lnB12 in testing the two-state model against the three-state model with
a constrained ¦ transition matrix is over 7000, while the value of 2lnB12 for the two-state
model against the unconstrained ¦ model is over 8800. Any value above 10 is interpreted as
very strong evidence against the null model. These values are consistent with the tight posterior
standard error bounds for the parameters in Table 5, which result from the fairly large panel
of IPOs used in the estimation. We also ﬁnd strong evidence of the unrestricted ¦ three-state
model against the constrained ¦ three-state speciﬁcation, with a value of 2lnB12 above 1400.
Nevertheless, we examine the implied small sample statistics of IPO underperformance for all
15 Traditional maximum likelihood ratio tests are computationally very difﬁcult to compute because of the
presence of nuisance parameters that must be integrated out in the test statistics (see, for example, Davies, 1987).
21our Markov models.
IV. Is IPO Underperformance a Statistical Fluke?
In this section, we ask whether it is surprising to measure an average long-run IPO under-
performance in a small sample and how likely a small sample contains a lower frequency of
outperforming IPOs than the population distribution.
A. Robust Statistical Inference
To conduct robust small sample inference, we generate a small sample distribution of the CAR
and CHP statistics (in equations (2) and (4)) measuring IPO performance. We construct the
small sample distribution from the estimates of the Markov-switching model in Table 5 and the
delisting process in equation (14) as follows. First, we draw the delisting time Ti for ﬁrm i from
the distribution in equation (14). If Ti > 60, we simulate a full 60-month event-time series
for the IPO. If Ti < 60, the ﬁrm delists prior to the 60-month horizon. Then, we generate a
time-series of IPO returns for ﬁrm i from the Markov process in equation (6) for the number of
surviving periods of the IPO.16
We simulate 4,843 IPO ﬁrms in for each small sample. This corresponds to the number of
IPOs in our sample in our post-1970 sample period. In the sample, we compute the CAR and
CHP statistics and store their values. We repeat this procedure 10,000 times. In this way, we
obtainadistributionofsmallsampleCARandCHPstatisticstowhichwecancomparethepoint
estimates of the CAR and CHP in the actual IPO data. Note that the small sample distribution
of the IPO underperformance statistics is constructed under the null of zero expected abnormal
IPO returns because the DGP is estimated under this null. We also take into account parameter
uncertaintybydrawingfromtheposteriordistributionof theparameters. Thatis, eachoneofthe
10,000 simulated samples is constructed using a different draw from the posterior distribution of
16 In the rare instance that a simulated return is less than -1 in equation (6), we assume the ﬁrm delists at that
time. Note that actual delisting returns are not used in computing the event-time CAR and CHP statistics.
22the parameters. However, simulating only from the posterior mean of the parameters produces
almost identical results because of the tight posterior standard deviations of all the parameter
estimates.
B. Empirical Results
Table 6 reports the small sample distribution of CAR statistics from each model. We report
results for the full sample in Panel A. The CAR(NYSE/AMEX) estimated in the data for the
60-month event horizon is -0.227 (see Table 1). In contrast, under the two-state model, the CAR
small sample distribution is positively skewed, even though there is no expected abnormal IPO
performance under the null. Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), and Brav
(2000) also report skewed CAR statistics in small samples. The mean and median of the small
sample CAR distribution is 0.041, much higher than the -0.227 CAR estimate in data. Note
that while the small sample CAR distribution for the unconstrained ¦ three-state model, with
a mean CAR of 0.002, produces less bias than the two-state or the constrained ¦ three-state
model, the mean and median of the small sample CAR distribution is still much higher than the
CAR point statistic of -0.227 in the data. However, the large difference per se does not rule out
a small sample explanation for the post-1970 IPO underperformance. In order to do this, we
must look at the entire small sample distribution to compute a p-value.
Table6reportsvariouspercentilevaluesforamoredetailedpictureofthesmallsampleCAR
distribution. The data point estimate of -0.227 falls nowhere in the simulated small sample
distribution, for either the two-state or the three-state models. For the two-state model, the
0.5% cutoff is -0.026. The 0.5% cut-off for the three-state models are -0.037 and -0.081, for
the constrained transition probability estimation and the unconstrained transition probability
matrix ¦, respectively. Since the effective p-value of the -0.227 CAR estimate under the small
sample distributions is zero, we overwhelmingly reject the hypothesis that small sample bias
can account for the IPO underperformance in the post-1970 sample.
While a small sample explanation may be very unlikely over the post-1970 data, a valid
question is that when Ritter (1991) ﬁrst raised the question of long-run IPO underperformance,
23his shorter data sample might not have been able to rule out a Peso problem explanation.
Perhaps it is only with the addition of the late 1980s and 1990s data that the IPO effect
has become statistically robust. Panel B of Table 6 investigates this possibility. We use the
original Ritter (1991) sample from 1975 to 1984. Using Ritter’s original event horizon of 36
months, the CAR in his data sample is -0.251. To construct the CAR small sample distribution
corresponding to Ritter’s data, we re-estimate the models over Ritter’s sample period, and
simulate small samples of 1,524 ﬁrms.
Panel B of Table 6 shows that the -0.251 estimate of Ritter’s CAR also overwhelmingly
rejects the null hypothesis. The 0.5% percentile values range from -0.098 for the constrained ¦
three-state model to -0.161 for the unconstrained ¦ three-state model. Again, this is nowhere
close to the -0.251 data estimate. Hence, Ritter’s (1991) original sample also strongly rejects the
notion that his original IPO underperformance ﬁndings are merely due to small sample effects.
In Panel A of Table 7, we compare CHP estimates in data with simulated CHP small sample
distributions. Over the full sample, the CHP(NYSE/AMEX) statistic is -0.137 over ﬁve years,
correspondingtoanannualizednumberof-0.029perannuminTable1. NotethattheCHPsmall
sample distributions are biased upwards, ranging from 0.078 for the two-state model to a very
large 0.463 for the constrained ¦ three-state estimation. The constrained ¦ has a much larger
probability of remaining in the extraordinarily high performing state than the unconstrained ¦
matrix. This allows for some highly positively skewed draws that result in a strong positive bias
for the long-horizon CHP statistics.
Similar to the CAR results in Table 6, the small sample CHP distributions in Table 7
overwhelming reject the null hypothesis of zero expected abnormal IPO performance. The data
CHP estimate of -0.137 falls nowhere close to the bottom 0.5% or 1% cutoff of the small sample
CHP distributions. In particular, the most negative 1% cutoff is -0.044 from the unconstrained
¦ three-state model. Hence, the data again resolutely rejects a small sample explanation of IPO
underperformance.
In Panel B, we examine the CHP distributions for the Ritter (1991) sample. In Ritter’s data,
the CHP statistic is -0.127. While this point estimate lies below the 0.05% tail for the two-state
24modelandtheconstrained¦three-statemodel, theleft-mosttailofthethree-stateunconstrained
¦ model does encompass the -0.127 value. However, we still reject that the CHP value is equal
to zero at the 5% level using a two-sided test (with the lower 2.5% cutoff equal to -0.122).
In our analysis, we use the NYSE/AMEX benchmark to construct the adjusted IPO
returns to estimate the model and to construct the small sample distributions of the IPO
performance statistics. We resoundingly reject the null hypothesis that small sample effects
could be responsible for the underperformance relative to the NYSE/AMEX benchmark.
This benchmark does not produce the largest or most signiﬁcant point estimates of IPO
underperformance in either event time or calendar time from Tables 1 and 2. Hence, other
aggregate benchmarks that produce more severe measures of event-time or calendar-time
underperformance, like the NASDAQ and small stock benchmarks, can only result in more
overwhelming rejections of a small sample explanation of IPO underperformance.
One possible use of our Markov-switching model that we do not examine here is that the
model may be able to identify those ﬁrms where poor IPO performance is very likely (the
underperforming state), or those IPOs whose performance is extremely good (the star performer
state). Since these states are persistent, an active investor may be able to infer the probability of
each regime for each IPO and form a trading strategy to go long in the most promising IPO ﬁrms
and short the least promising IPOs. We leave this application of the model to future research.
C. Comparative Statics
In this section, we ask how extreme the distribution of winners must be to fail to reject the null
of zero average long-run underperformance in the small sample distribution. This is a useful
exercise because since the structure of the model is able to capture a Peso problem, we can
compare the estimates of the model to a distribution of superstar IPO returns (state 1) where
we would not be surprised to observe the degree of IPO underperformance present in the actual
data. In this exercise, we focus on the original Ritter (1991) CAR statistic.17 That is, what
17 If we repeat the exercise using the CHP statistic, there is no choice of parameter values for the distribution
of superstar IPO returns that can produce small sample distributions where we fail to reject the null at a 95%
25characteristics of the superstar state are necessary to conclude that the IPO underperformance
may be a Peso problem?
Our goal is to determine the value of parameter ¹1, the expected return of the superstar state,
where the small sample distribution implied by the model could resemble the observed degree
of IPO underperformance in data. To do this, we gradually increase the value of ¹1 from its
estimated value in the three-state Markov model. As we change ¹1, we simulate from the point
estimates of the parameter values in Table 5, keeping all other parameters the same, except
we alter ¹3 so that we maintain the null of zero expected abnormal performance in equation
(11). Figure 2 plots the p-value of the CAR point statistic in data, starting from the parameter
estimates in Table 5 where the p-value is zero, as a function of ¹1. This is a two-sided p-value
and, hence, represents two times the proportion of the small sample distribution lying to the left
of the long horizon CAR point statistic of -0.227. The top (bottom) row of Figure 2 performs
this comparative static exercise over the full (Ritter (1991)) sample. The left- (right-) hand
column reports the case for the constrained (unconstrained) transition probability three-state
model.
Figure 2 shows that in order for a small sample explanation to account for the degree of IPO
underperformance in data, the expected return of the winner state has to be truly spectacular.
Over the full sample, we must increase ¹1 to over 3.00 or higher per month to produce a p-value
higher than 0.05. From the stable probability of state 1 in Table 5, this means that over 2%
of all IPOs have to triple their values every month. There are clearly some IPOs which more
than triple their value occasionally, like the top ten highest monthly returns reported in Panel A
of Table 3, but these represent the top ten among 243,338 total one-month event returns in the
full sample of 4,843 ﬁrms. Similarly, in the Ritter (1991) sample, the estimate of ¹1 must be
approximately 2.00 for the constrained ¦ estimation, and close to 15.00 for the unconstrained
¦ model. Thus, an absurd number of spectacularly performing ﬁrms must be present in the
population distribution in order for a small sample explanation to account for the IPO long-run
underperformance phenomenon.
conﬁdence level.
26The plots in Figure 2 further strengthen the conclusion that a small sample effect is highly
unlikely to be driving the IPO long-run underperformance puzzle. Instead, they suggest that
the low returns of IPO ﬁrms over the last three decades are robust, and that the IPO long-run
underperformance puzzle is not a statistical ﬂuke.
V. Conclusion
The long-run underperformance of IPOs has been an active topic in the IPO literature over
the last decade since Ritter (1991). Yet, recent work, most notably by Gompers and Lerner
(2003), suggests that the post-1970 long-run IPO underperformance could be simply a statistical
ﬂuke. Our study presents new evidence supporting the existence of the IPO underperformance
effect. First, we show that IPO underperformance remains robust both in event time and in
calendar time. Schultz (2003) fails to ﬁnd IPO underperformance in calendar time because he
considersonlyashortone-monthholding-periodhorizon. CalendartimeIPOunderperformance
reappears with longer holding-period horizons, or longer portfolio-formation periods.
Second, we present evidence suggesting that IPO underperformance is highly unlikely to
be the result of a statistical ﬂuke. We construct a Markov-switching model that captures small
sample, or “Peso problem” effects. At each point in time, IPO returns have the potential to be
drawn from superstar states with very high expected returns. A small sample underperformance
puzzle may result if we observe too few of these draws ex-post, even if the population
distribution exhibits no ex-ante underperformance. In our estimation, we impose the null of
no ex-ante IPO underperformance.
We ﬁnd that the small sample distributions implied by the model for the event-time statistics
measuring IPO underperformance do not even come remotely close to encompassing the point
statistics in the data. Hence, the null hypothesis that a small sample effect is responsible for
IPO underperformance is overwhelmingly rejected. Moreover, the degree of outperformance
required for a small sample explanation to hold requires that approximately one in 50 IPOs
must at least triple their values every month.
27By establishing the robustness of the IPO underperformance puzzle, we lay the groundwork
for future research to economically explain this important, statistically robust phenomenon.
Some explanations that have been proposed to date include earnings management (Teoh, Welch
and Wong (1998)), constraints on shorting IPOs combined with heterogeneous expectations of
investors (Miller (1977)), or behavioral biases (Hirshleifer (2001)), among others.
28Appendix
We estimate the model in Section III using Gibbs sampling, adapting the methodology
developed by Kim, Nelson and Startz (1998) and Kim and Nelson (1999). The set of parameters
we estimate is:
£ = ( ~ P; ~ ¾
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probabilities. For estimation purposes, we parameterize ¾2
2 as ¾2
2 = ¾2




1(1 + h2)(1 + h3).
Let Ti denote ﬁrm i’s surviving period and let n be the number of ﬁrms in the sample. We
deﬁne a Markov state vector of ﬁrm i as ~ sTi = [si;1 si;2 ::: si;Ti], for ﬁrms i = 1;2;:::;n, and
a stacked state vector of all ﬁrms as ~ sT = [s1;1 ::: s1;T1 s2;1 :::s2;T2 ::: sn;1 ::: sn;Tn], where
T =
Pn
i=1 Ti. Similarly, we write the vector of returns for the ith IPO as ~ rTi = [ri;1 ri;2 ::: ri;Ti]
and denote the collected vector of returns for all IPOs as ~ rT = [r1;1 :::r1;T1 ::: rn;1 ::: rn;Tn].
Since the states are unobserved to the econometrician, we treat them as parameters and drawn
them via Gibbs-sampling. Hence, the random variables to be drawn are £ and the stacked
Markov states vector ~ sT.
The Gibbs sampling algorithm iterates successively over the following conditional distribu-
tions. Each iteration simulates a drawing from the joint posterior distribution of all the state
variables and the model’s parameters, given the data:
P1) Generate ~ sT, conditional on ~ ¹; ~ ¾2; ~ P and ~ rT:
P2) Generate ~ ¹, conditional on ~ ¾2; ~ sT and ~ rT:
P3) Generate ~ ¾2, conditional on ~ ¹; ~ sT and ~ rT:
P4) Generate ~ P, conditional on ~ sT:
29Note that in (P2), by the null hypothesis that ~ ¹0~ ¼ = 0 in equation (11), only ¹1 is generated
and the value of the other conditional mean parameter is inferred. In (P4), ~ P only requires
knowledge of the states ~ sT. All the conditional distributions (P1) to (P4) are also conditional
on the delisting times, which are exogenously given by a Geometric distribution. Conditional
on observing the delisting time, we can separate the estimation of the Geometric distribution
and the Markov-switching DGP because we assume that the Markov-switching process holds
conditional on the delisting time, and the delisting process is unaffected by the parameters of
the Markov DGP. We describe drawing parameters from each conditional distribution in turn.
(P1) Drawing ~ sT, Conditional on ~ ¹; ~ ¾2; ~ P and ~ rTi
We assume independence of returns across ﬁrms. Thus, we can generate ~ sTi, conditional on ﬁrm
i surviving to Ti. We then stack ~ sTi to construct ~ sT. To generate ~ sTi, we ﬁrst run the Hamilton
(1989) ﬁlter to obtain the conditional distributions g(si;tj~ ri;t) for all t.
Let Ãi;t¡1 denote the information set up to time t ¡ 1 for ﬁrm i, which represents lagged
ﬁrm i returns. Given Pr[si;t¡1 = kjÃi;t¡1] at the beginning of time t, and using Bayes’ rule,
(A-1) Pr[si;t = j;si;t¡1 = kjÃi;t¡1] = Pr[si;t = jjsi;t¡1 = k]Pr[si;t¡1 = kjÃi;t¡1];
where Pr[si;t = jjsi;t¡1] = Pr[st = jjst¡1 = k] are the transition probabilities ~ P, which are
ﬁrm invariant.
We update the probability Pr[si;t = j;si;t¡1 = kjÃi;t¡1] using:
(A-2) Pr[si;t = j;si;t¡1 = kjÃi;t] =




si;t¡1=1 f(ri;tjsi;t = j;si;t¡1 = k;Ãi;t¡1)Pr[si;t = j;si;t¡1 = kjÃi;t¡1]
;
where K is the number of states and













30since the state-dependent parameters ¹st ´ ¹(st) and ¾st ´ ¾(st) are the same across ﬁrms.





Pr[si;t = j;si;t¡1 = kjÃi;t]:
The last run of the Hamilton (1989) ﬁlter provides us with g(si;Tij~ rTi), from which we can
generate sTi. We then backwards generate si;t, conditional on ~ ri;t and si;t+1;t = Ti ¡ 1;Ti ¡
2;:::;1, using the multi-move Carter and Kohn (1994) algorithm adapted by Kim and Nelson
(1999). This uses the following result:
(A-4) g(si;tj~ ri;t;si;t+1) / g(si;t+1jsi;t)g(si;tj~ ri;t);
where g(si;t+1jsi;t) = g(st+1jst) is the transition probability. We calculate Pr[si;t =
kjsi;t+1; ~ ri;t] using:
(A-5) Pr[si;t = kjsi;t+1; ~ ri;t] =
g(st+1jst = 1)g(si;t = kj~ ri;t)
PK
j=1 g(st+1jst = j)g(si;t = jj~ ri;t)
:
The Carter-Kohn (1994) algorithm simulates si;t;t = 1;2;:::;Ti; as a block from the joint
distribution g(~ sTij~ ¹; ~ ¾2; ~ P; ~ rTi). The algorithm is run for each ﬁrm i separately.
Next, we describe draws from (P2) through (P4) for a three-state Markov model with
unrestricted transition probabilities as a general case. Our other models are special cases (and
involve a reduced number of parameters).
P2) Drawing ~ ¹, Conditional on ~ ¾2; ~ sT and ~ rT
Equation (6) can be rewritten in the following form:
(A-6) rit = ¹1¹ s1it + ¹2¹ s2it + ¹3¹ s3it + ¾sit"it;
if we let k = 1;2;3, and deﬁne:




1 if sit = k
0 otherwise.
31Dividing both sides of equation (A-6) by ¾sit, we obtain:
(A-8) r
y





¾sit and xkit =
¹ skit
¾sit. Note that ¾sit takes only the values of ¾st, which are common
to all ﬁrms, but the actual value ¾sit depends on ﬁrm i and time t. Using this notation, we can
rewrite equation (A-8) in matrix notation as:
(A-9) R
y = X~ ¹ + V; V » N(0;IT)









all n ﬁrms and X = [x1t x2t x3t] stacks the values of xkit for the different values of the regime
k across the rows and all the time-series of ﬁrm returns across the columns.
If we assume a normal prior for ~ ¹ of ~ ¹j~ ¾2 » N(b0;B0), the posterior distribution




0 b0 + X0Ry) and
B1 = (B
¡1
0 + X0X)¡1. We assign a value of zero to b0 and B
¡1
0 , which effectively represent a
non-informative prior.
P3) Drawing ~ ¾2, Conditional on ~ ¹; ~ sT and ~ rT:





1¹ s1it + ¾
2
2¹ s2it + ¾
2
3¹ s3it;
for the vector of realizations of conditional variances corresponding to the stacked returns ~ rTi










1(1+h2)(1+h3). Using this speciﬁcation of ¾1, h2, and h3,
we ﬁrst generate ¾2





1, conditional on h2 and h3, we divide both sides of equation (6) by
p
































(1 + ¹ s2ith2)(1 + ¹ s3ith2)(1 + ¹ s3ith3)
:












We choose an Inverted Gamma distribution as a conjugate prior for ¾2
1, so ¾2





2 ). Kim and Nelson (1999) show that the posterior distribution is also an Inverted
Gamma distribution given by ¾2











3t). We assign a value of zero to º0 and ±0 to represent a
non-informative prior.
To generate ¹ h2 = (1 + h2), conditional on ¾2

















t » IIDN(0;(1 + h2));
where r??














2 ); the conditional
posterior distribution of ¹ h2 = 1 + h2 is given by ¹ h2j¾2











3t). The set N2 represents the
33realizations of states 2 or 3 across ﬁrms, N2 = ft : sit = 2 or 3g and ¹ T2 is the total number of
simulated states 2 or 3 across ﬁrms. We assign a value of zero to º2 and ±2 for the prior, which
effectively represents agnostic beliefs.
We generate ¹ h3 = 1 + h3 in a similar fashion to generating ¹ h2 = (1 + h2).
(P4) Drawing ~ P = [P11 P12 P21 P22 P32 P33], conditional on ~ sT
Conditional on the states ~ sT, the transition probabilities are independent of ~ rT and the other
parameters of the model. Since the transitions of each ﬁrm are independent of the transition of
each other ﬁrm, we can use the combined transitions of all ﬁrms to estimate ~ P. We introduce
the notation njk, j;k = 1;2;3 to represent the total number of transitions from state st¡1 = j
to st = k, t = 2;3;:::;T, where we consider the total transitions of all ﬁrms. Deﬁne ¹ Pjj =
Pr[st 6= jjst¡1 = j];j = 1;2;3; and ¹ Pjk = Pr[st = kjst¡1 = j;st 6= j] for k 6= j. Then,
Pjk = Pr[st = kjst¡1 = j] = ¹ Pjk £(1¡Pjj) for k 6= j. Similarly, deﬁne ¹ njj to be the number
of transitions from state st¡1 = j to st 6= j.
By taking the Beta family of distributions as conjugate priors, Kim and Nelson (1999) show
that the posterior distributions of Pjj are given by Beta distributions Pjjj~ sT » Beta(ujj +
njj; ¹ ujj + ¹ njj), where ujj and ¹ ujj are the known hyperparameters of the priors. We assign a
value of zero to ujj and ¹ ujj.
Drawing the other off-diagonal elements in the ¦ transition probability matrix is a
straightforward generalization of the method used to draw the diagonal transition probabilities
Pjj. For example, given P11, P12 can be computed by P12 = ¹ P12 £ (1 ¡ P11), where ¹ P12 is
drawn from the posterior beta distribution ¹ P12j~ sT » Beta(u12 + n12;u13 + n13), where u12 and
u13 are the known hyperparameters of the prior Beta distribution. Similar to the draws for Pjj,
we assign a value of zero to u12 and u13. Finally, conditional on P11 and P12, the adding up
constraint implies P13 = 1 ¡ P11 ¡ P12. The other off-diagonal elements in ¦ are similarly
drawn.
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39Table 1: Event-Time IPO Returns
Event Month
1 12 24 36 48 60
Number of Surviving Firms 4843 4767 4369 3882 3411 2966
Percentage of Surviving Firms 100% 98.4% 90.2% 80.2% 70.4% 61.2%
Panel A
CAR(NYSE/AMEX) 0.008** -0.071** -0.164** -0.221** -0.231** -0.227**
(2.76) (-7.30) (-11.5) (-11.9) (-10.1) (-8.26)
CAR(NASDAQ) 0.010** -0.052** -0.156** -0.243** -0.305** -0.313**
(3.66) (-5.45) (-11.1) (-13.3) (-13.5) (-11.6)
CAR(SMALL) 0.007* -0.060** -0.146** -0.170** -0.156** -0.158**
(2.46) (-6.26) (-10.3) (-9.24) (-6.87) (-5.82)
Panel B
CHP(NYSE/AMEX)annualized 0.096** -0.046** -0.049** -0.044** -0.033** -0.029**
(3.16) (-5.28) (-7.17) (-7.72) (-2.87) (-5.38)
CHP(NASDAQ)annualized 0.127** -0.028** -0.044** -0.045** -0.041** -0.036**
(4.22) (-3.18) (-6.75) (-8.49) (-8.32) (-7.11)
CHP(SMALL)annualized 0.083** -0.037** -0.041** -0.028** -0.013* -0.014*
(2.81) (-4.32) (-6.07) (-4.50) (-2.10) (-2.22)
Panel A reports summary statistics of the benchmark-adjusted cumulative average returns (CAR) as in
equation (2), which following Ritter (1991) are not annualized. Panel B reports the annualized cumulative
abnormal excess holding-period returns (CHP) in equation (5) of benchmark returns. We report t-
statistics, computed following Ritter (1991), in parentheses under the corresponding mean. The benchmarks
NYSE/AMEX, NASDAQ, and SMALL are the CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX index, the value-
weighted NASDAQ index and the smallest NYSE size decile, respectively. We denote signiﬁcance at the
5% and 1% levels with * and **, respectively. The sample period is January 1970 to December 1996, with
the last ﬁve year period ending at December 2001.
40Table 2: Calendar-Time IPO Returns
Holding Period Horizon (Months)
1 6 12 36 60
Panel A: Formation Period = 1 Year
Mean Return (Unadjusted) 0.159** 0.129* 0.110** 0.120** 0.139*
(2.81) (2.56) (2.59) (2.72) (2.17)
Mean Return(NYSE/AMEX) 0.014 -0.014 -0.035 -0.039 -0.023
(0.41) (-0.42) (-1.02) (-0.66) (-0.23)
Mean Return(NASDAQ) -0.015 -0.053* -0.072* -0.075 -0.069
(-0.65) (-2.21) (-2.58) (-1.42) (-0.72)
Mean Return(SMALL) -0.024 -0.057* -0.075** -0.102* -0.124
(-0.74) (-2.05) (-2.92) (-2.62) (-1.80)
Panel B: Formation Period = 3 Years
Mean Return (Unadjusted) 0.146** 0.110* 0.110* 0.121* 0.114*
(2.80) (2.33) (2.57) (2.59) (2.31)
Mean Return(NYSE/AMEX) 0.002 -0.031 -0.035 -0.036 -0.071
(0.07) (-0.95) (-1.01) (-0.58) (-0.85)
Mean Return(NASDAQ) -0.027 -0.069** -0.072* -0.073 -0.130
(-1.30) (-2.97) (-2.60) (-1.33) (-1.71)
Mean Return(SMALL) -0.035 -0.073** -0.074** -0.099* -0.206**
(-1.39) (-3.03) (-3.18) (-2.44) (-3.21)
The table reports mean holding period returns (unadjusted) and mean adjusted-holding period returns, relative
to NYSE/AMEX, NASDAQ, and SMALL benchmarks. We form a portfolio of IPOs which have gone public
within the past one year (top panel) or past three years (bottom panel) and hold this portfolio for various
holding period horizons. The means are computed with overlapping observations, so we report Newey-West
(1987) t-statistics in parentheses with a lag length of one less than the holding period horizon in months. All
the returns in the table are reported in annualized terms. We denote signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1% levels
with * and **, respectively. The sample period starts from January 1970 for the three-year formation period
and from January 1972 for the one-year formation period. Both samples in Panels A and B end at December
2001.
41Table 3: Top Performing IPOs
Panel A: Top 10 Highest Monthly Returns
Name Monthly Return Event Month Issue Date
Club-Theatre Network Inc 25.0 21 05/15/90
SoloPoint Inc 5.91 28 06/06/96
Smith Micro Software Inc 5.64 54 09/18/95
Viisage Technology Inc 5.61 59 11/08/96
Exploration Co 5.60 38 11/19/79
Humascan Inc 4.50 30 08/12/96
ECO2 Inc 4.36 33 10/22/92
SkyMall Inc 3.99 25 12/11/96
Western Power & Equipment Corp 3.88 59 06/13/95
Hungarian Broadcasting Corp 3.58 36 12/20/95
Panel B: Top 10 Largest 5-Year Cumulative Returns
5-Year 5-Year Annualized
Name Cumulative Return Cumulative Return Issue Date
CMG Information Services Inc 147 1.72 01/25/94
American Power Conversion 70.3 1.35 07/22/88
Network Appliance Inc 55.8 1.24 11/21/95
Ascend Communications Inc 50.3 1.20 05/12/94
SDL Inc 42.4 1.13 03/15/95
Ryan’s Family Steak Houses 40.3 1.10 07/13/82
Zoltek Cos Inc 34.6 1.04 11/06/92
StrataCom Inc 31.7 1.01 07/21/92
Cisco Systems Inc 24.2 0.91 02/16/90
Liz Claiborne Inc 24.1 0.91 06/09/81
The table reports the highest 10 one-month IPO returns in Panel A. In Panel B, we report the 10 IPOs with
the largest 5-year post-issue cumulative returns. The returns in the table are in levels, not percentages. The
sample period is January 1970 to December 2001.
Table 4: Actual and Expected Number of Surviving Firms
Event Month Actual Geometric Poisson
1 4843 4843 4843
6 4830 4652 4843
12 4767 4433 4843
24 4369 4026 4713
36 3882 3656 2050
48 3411 3320 89
60 2966 3015 0
The table reports the actual number of IPO’s surviving k months from issue in the second column (which
is the same as the ﬁrst row of Table 1). The column labeled ‘Geometric’ reports the expected number of
surviving ﬁrms from the Geometric distribution in equation (14), while the last column reports the expected
number of surviving ﬁrms from a Poisson distribution ﬁtted to the data. The sample period is January 1970
to December 2001.
42Table 5: Parameter Estimates
Panel A: Two-State Model









































Panel B: Three-State Model



























































































































We report parameter estimates of the two-state and three-state model in equation (6). For the two-state model
in Panel A, the the state-dependent means ¹(sit) are estimated subject to the restriction in equation (9), with
the transition matrix given by equation (7). For the three-state models in Panel B, the means ¹(sit) are
estimated subject to the restriction in equation (13). The model labeled ‘Constrained ¦’ is estimated with
the transition probability matrix ¦ described in equation (10), while the unconstrained estimation imposes no
constraints on the transition probability matrix. The vector ¼ represents the stable probability of the system.
The sample period is January 1970 to December 2001.
43Table 6: CAR Small Sample Distribution
Panel A: Full sample
CAR in data = -0.227
Two State Model Three State Model
Constrained ¦ Unconstrained ¦
Mean 0.041 0.043 0.002
Std 0.026 0.031 0.033
Median 0.041 0.044 0.001
Percentiles
0.5% -0.026 -0.037 -0.081
1.0% -0.020 -0.030 -0.073
2.5% -0.010 -0.019 -0.061
5.0% -0.002 -0.008 -0.052
95.0% 0.085 0.094 0.057
97.5% 0.093 0.104 0.068
99.0% 0.102 0.115 0.082
99.5% 0.109 0.122 0.092
Panel B: Ritter (1991) data, 1975-1984
CAR in data = -0.251
Two State Model Three State Model
Constrained ¦ Unconstrained ¦
Mean 0.008 0.010 0.010
Std 0.044 0.042 0.069
Median 0.007 0.010 0.008
Percentiles
0.5% -0.104 -0.098 -0.161
1.0% -0.092 -0.088 -0.143
2.5% -0.077 -0.072 -0.119
5.0% -0.064 -0.059 -0.099
95.0% 0.078 0.079 0.128
97.5% 0.093 0.092 0.154
99.0% 0.110 0.109 0.182
99.5% 0.122 0.118 0.209
The table reports summary statistics of the small sample distribution of the CAR statistic (equation (2))
by simulating from the posterior distribution of the parameter estimates reported in Table 5 using 10,000
simulations. Panel A corresponds to the sample of IPOs going public from January 1970 to December 1996,
with an event horizon of 60 months. Panel B corresponds to Ritter’s (1991) original sample, consisting of
IPOs going public from 1975 to 1984, with an event horizon of 36 months.
44Table 7: CHP Small Sample Distribution
Panel A: Full sample
CHP in data = -0.137
Two State Model Three State Model
Constrained ¦ Unconstrained ¦
Mean 0.078 0.463 0.080
Std 0.064 3.155 0.123
Median 0.070 0.319 0.064
Percentiles
0.5% -0.037 0.090 -0.054
1.0% -0.028 0.106 -0.044
2.5% -0.014 0.133 -0.028
5.0% -0.002 0.154 -0.016
95.0% 0.181 0.871 0.211
97.5% 0.214 1.227 0.265
99.0% 0.274 2.120 0.387
99.5% 0.343 3.571 0.520
Panel B: Ritter (1991) data, 1975-1984
CHP in data = -0.127
Two State Model Three State Model
Constrained ¦ Unconstrained ¦
Mean 0.187 0.234 0.124
Std 0.224 0.334 1.100
Median 0.169 0.187 0.041
Percentiles
0.5% -0.013 -0.006 -0.159
1.0% 0.004 0.008 -0.142
2.5% 0.025 0.030 -0.122
5.0% 0.045 0.050 -0.102
95.0% 0.374 0.514 0.457
97.5% 0.439 0.681 0.687
99.0% 0.548 0.987 1.283
99.5% 0.651 1.499 2.289
The table reports summary statistics of the small sample distribution of the CHP statistic (equation (5))
by simulating from the posterior distribution of the parameter estimates reported in Table 5 using 10,000
simulations. Panel corresponds to the sample of IPOs going public from January 1970 to December 1996,
with an event horizon of 60 months. Panel B corresponds to Ritter’s (1991) original sample, consisting of
IPOs going public from 1975 to 1984, with an event horizon of 36 months.
45Figure 1: A Simple Example of the Small Sample Bias











Bad, -5% Bad, -5%
Average excess return 
= 0.02×0.7+0.7×0+0.28×(-0.05)
= 0%
Average excess return 
= 0.01×0.7+0.7×0+0.29×(-0.05)
= -0.75%
The ﬁgure shows a population versus small-sample distribution, illustrating how ex-post underperformance might be
realized in a small sample generated from a population distribution with no ex-ante underperformance.
46Figure 2: P-value of the CAR Statistic as a Function of ¹1

















Constrained Π System, Full Sample

















Unconstrained Π System, Full Sample

















Constained Π System, Ritter Sample

















Unconstrained Π System, Ritter Sample
Each plot graphs the p-value of the CAR statistic as a function of ¹1, the mean of the IPO return in the outperforming
state, in the three-state Markov model. We start with the point marked with a circle, which represents the p-value from
Table 6, which is zero, corresponding to the estimated value of ¹1 in Table 5. The top row displays the results using
the full sample data and the bottom row displays results for the Ritter (1991) sample.
47